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Cognitive-genetic narratology and the fictional 







    Although modernist writers claimed to “look within” and portray the workings of 
the mind rather than the material world “out there”, recent criticism has punctured their self-
established myth of an “inward turn” by demonstrating how fictional minds in modernist 
narratives can be considered from the perspective of the extended mind theory. David Herman 
(2011) has convincingly shown that modernist evocations of the mind, despite innovative 
narratological techniques such as stream-of-consciousness or interior monologue, can actually 
be analysed as distributed forms of cognition. Dirk Van Hulle (2014) has reinforced Herman’s 
suggestions and demonstrated the possibilities of adding a genetic approach. This paper wishes 
to underline both Herman’s as Van Hulle’s suggestions by examining two chapters from Virginia 
Woolf’s To the lighthouse (1927), thus further demonstrating how the modernists’ intuitive 
shaping of fictional “extended minds” was informed by their own cognitive experiences with 
“thinking on paper”. The cognitive processes at work during Woolf’s writing can be traced 
in manuscripts, drafts and notebooks and clearly demonstrate the “extended mind” at work. 
By taking into account the cognitive aspect of the production of storyworlds through an 
examination of a work’s genesis, a third dimension can be added to recent developments in 
cognitive narratology, a domain which, so far, has been mainly concerned with the levels of the 
narrative and the reader. Furthermore, this paper will elaborate on the theoretical implications 
of combining genetic criticism and cognitive narratology, not only for a further renegotiation 
of the modernist project but also for the concept of authorship within the domain of genetic 
criticism. The central aim of my further research will be to investigate if the application of 
the theories of distributed cognition can provide a re-definition of literary authorship and 
authorial intention. 
Genetic criticism and authorship
 
Genetic criticism, or critique génétique, has been defined by Daniel Ferrer as “la science 
de l’invention écrite”
2
 since its aim entails the study of the writing process of a literary work 
through the collection, cataloguing and examination of manuscripts, notebooks and drafts 
that constitute the genetic dossier of a published work. Since any writing process necessarily 
implies a sense of human creative agency,
3
 it is unavoidable to touch upon the delicate subject 
of “authorship” whilst performing the genetic-critical analysis of any given work. This explains 
why genetic criticism is placed alongside various disciplines such as discourse analysis and 
literary sociology in assertions of the “resurrection” of the author within literary theory.
4
 
The notion of an author’s resurrection necessarily implies his previous death and this event 
was proclaimed by the major theoreticians of post-structuralism, who took the tenets of 
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New Criticism’s intentional fallacy
5
 one step further in asserting the loss of any 
authorial centre in a text. Especially in Roland Barthes’ “The death of the author” 
(1967) and S/Z (1970) the necessarily variable and undeterminable meaning of texts 
was demonstrated by pointing out that any discourse, including a literary text, can 
be shown to be full of gaps and contradictions that do not lead to any centre of 
signification. Since no text contains a definite meaning, it is futile to find out what 
the original meaning or intention of the author would have been.
6
 





shed light on the manner in which any subject and any text is constrained by 
language, to the extent that “language speaks us” as Jacques Lacan articulated the 
matter in 1966 in his Ecrits
9
 and “all telling modifies what is being told, so that 
[...] what is told is always the telling”.
10
 This assumption imposes the relativity 
and changeability of textual meaning: “it changes those who participate in it and 
exists not in consciousness but in engagement with the world, and this implies 
that meaning is grounded in a shared subject matter that pre-exists the creator”.
11
 
Thus in post-structuralism’s rejection of authorial intention we find a concept of 
consciousness that is based on a denial of a dualistic mind-world split: the subject 
does not merely express its “inner self” to the “outside world”, since it is in the first 
place constituted by that outer reality, language forming an essential part of it. In 
this sense, cognition and consciousness must be regarded as “intralinguistic effects 
or metaphors” that have arisen out of a linguistic order that evolved before language 
was even consciously mastered.
12
 To find meaning in a work, it is necessary to do 
away with the idea of a rational human mind at the centre of human communication 
(Barthes’ and Derrida’s “metaphysics of presence”) and accept the “text” as a field of 
relations and language as a signifying system that does not express, but precedes 
and conditions thought.
13
Thus post-structuralism illuminated - together with concepts such as “genius”, 
“originality” and “oeuvre” - the unsustainability of a particular historical conception 
of the author as controlling presence, as unique individual expressing his most 
inner thoughts and replaced it with a model of authorship as constituted by a pre-
existing language totality.
14
 It opened up new insights into the extent to which 
creative consciousness is understood to control process and dismissed the location 
of agency as entirely interior.
15
 A fundamental notion in this respect was Julia 
Kristeva’s redefinition of the text as “productivity” and her development of the 
concept of “intertextuality”, claiming that all forms of discourse or text are based 
on the transformation of other systems of signs. In the same period, literary authors 
themselves started stressing the character of their works as processes and genetic 
criticism was established as a new literary approach.
16
 Although poststructuralist, 
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this intention could ever be revealed. 
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century, with Edmund Husserl 
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8 Burke, S. The death and return 
of the author: criticism and 
subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault 
and Derrida. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998, pp.14-5; 
Bushell, S. Op. cit.,  2009, p. 52.
9 Quoted in Caughie, P. L. “Postmodern 
and poststructuralist approaches 
to virginia woolf.” In: Palgrave 
advances in Virginia Woolf studies, 
edited by Anna Snaith. Palgrave/




10 Howard, 1974, p. ix.
11 Bushell, S. Op. cit.,  2009, p. 52.
12 Burke, S. Op. cit.,  1998, p. 15.
13 Caughie, P. Op. cit., 2007, pp. 7-8.
14 Bushell, S. Op. cit., 2009, p. 47; 
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15 Bushell, S. Op. cit., 2009, p.42.
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anti-authorial rhetoric has been punctured
17
 and not all branches of literary theory 
have accepted the reduction of literature to an impersonal play of signification, the 
problem of the author remains deeply controversial to this day.
18
 It may even be 
called one of genetic criticism’s merits to be able to gain ground and thrive as a 
critical movement in “a theoretical climate so immersed in anti-authorialism”.
19
In one sense, genetic criticism can be regarded as a “true child” of the structuralist 
and poststructuralist movements, seeing their mutual emphasis on “the text as a 
mobile, multistranded entity, overflowing with referential codes”.
20
 However, like 
post-structuralism, genetic criticism dismisses the structuralist approach of the text 
as a closed system that “brackets” everyday social practices
21
  and cuts off the text from 
its genesis
22
  and in this sense the structuralist analysis of texts as clearly bounded 
sets can be regarded as the exact opposite of genetic study.
23
 While it does accept the 
text as mobile, genetic criticism refuses to ignore its genesis, partly because this only 
leads to a sacralization of the text instead of the author, and in that way does not 
resolve anything.
24
 Thus, instead of simply emphasizing the importance of text over 
author, genetic critics have contributed to the awareness of several texts and thus 
proven the validity of interpreting underlying manuscripts, drafts and notebooks 
to understanding the writing process and the interpretation of a published text. 
    From the onset in the 1970s genetic critics have been aware of the theoretical 
concerns regarding authorial intention and the criticism their own practice might 
invoke, and have attempted to define authorship in different ways. Although the 
practice has been described by some genetic critics, such as Almuth Grésillon,
25
 
as emerging out of a Romantic desire to be close to or identify with the author 
through the study of manuscripts or notebooks,
26
 many other approaches to 
authorship have been formulated. In fact many theoretical accounts emphasize that 
the interpretation of underlying versions and the studying of the intertextual web 
that has informed a published text, does not amount to trying to retrieve an author’s 
intentions and indeed, one of the merits of genetic-critical studies is the puncture 
of the Romantic conception of the autonomous and isolated author.
27
 Instead, and 





genetic-critical analyses have been able to lay bare the mechanical processes of 
writing as well as the extra-textual sources that may have served as sources of input 
to this process and therefore underline the “role of the author as a craftsman rather 
than a divinely inspired genius”.
30
 In this respect, John Bryant has pointed out the 
17 See for example Burke (1992) 
and Downey (2007).
18 Burke, S. Op. cit.,  1998, pp.18-23.
19 Davis, O. The author at work 
in genetic criticism. Paragraph 
25 (1),  2002, p. 101.
20 Deppman, J. et al. Genetic 
criticism: texts and avant-textes. 
Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 5.
21 Caughie, P. L. “Postmodern and 
poststructuralist approaches 
to Virginia Woolf.” In: Palgrave 
advances in Virginia Woolf studies, 
edited by Anna Snaith. Palgrave/




22 Van Hulle, D.  Op. cit., 2004, p. 3.
23 Hay, L. “Genetic criticism: origins 
and perspectives.” In: Genetic criticism: 
texts and avant-textes, edited by Jed 
Deppman, Daniel Ferrer and Michael 
Groden. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 20.
24 Deppman, J. et al., Op. cit., 2004, p. 5.
25 “Passion d’être au plus près d’un texte 
aimé puisqu’on assiste quasiment à 
sa renaissance, passion de toucher 
à l’authenticité que représente 
l’autographe, de voir le corps de 
l’écriture s’inscrire sur la page; 
passion fugace et inavouvée de 
s’identifier, le temps d’une descente 
et d’une remontée dans l’archéologie 
du texte, au créateur, d’entrer en 
fusion avec lui.” Grésillon, A. 
Eléments de critique génétique. Lire les 
manuscrits modernes (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1994), p. 13.  
Quoted in and translated by Davis, O. 
2002, p. 93: “The joy of being as close 
as possible to a text you adore, for 
you are present at what is almost its 
rebirth; the joy of coming into contact 
with the authenticity that handwriting 
represents, of seeing the body of the 
writing inscribe itself on the page; 
the fleeting and unacknowledged joy 
of identifying yourself, in the time it 
takes to descend into and resurface 
from the archaeology of the text, with 
its creator, of becoming one with him.” 
26 For this reason, the practice has 
been criticized. See for example 
Jenny (2000) and Davis (2002). 
27 Van Hulle, D. Op. cit.,  
2004, p. 26, p. 41.
28 Poe’s The philosophy of composition, 
1846, translated as Genèse d’un poème, 
became one of the foundational 
texts of French genetic criticism. 
29 Deppman, J.  et al. Op. cit., 2004, p. 3.
30 Van Hulle, D. Op. cit.,  2004, p. 7.
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difference between the concepts of writer and author, hereby emphasizing genetic criticism’s 
concerns with writing processes rather than with the sociology of authorship.
31
 In asserting 
that the writing process as such must be the subject of investigation, rather than the writer or 
author themselves, Jean Bellemin-Noël deemed it even possible to omit any mention of these 
human, individual centres of agency. In 1972, in Le Texte et l’avant-texte he characterized the 
aim of genetic criticism as showing 
[…] to what extent poems write themselves despite, or even against, authors who 
believe they are implementing their writerly craft; to find any uncontrolled -perhaps 
uncontrollable- forces that were mobilized without the author’s knowledge.
32
 
The study of genetic materials therefore reveals the way writers are never autonomous but 
constantly shaped by sociocultural givens and the texts they produce speak of social structures, 
ideologies and cultural traditions.
33
 Sally Bushell, building on Peter Shillingsburg’s distinction 
between “intention to mean” and “intention to do” characterizes the creative process as a 
dynamic interplay between a writer’s creative intentionality and the compositional context 
within which intentional acts occur. Intention must be regarded as an “ongoing event within 
the process [...] constantly being changed and redirected by the unintentional contexts with 
which it engages”.
34
 Such assertions indicate a clear affinity with poststructuralist accounts that 
emphasize intertextuality, whereby every text is “a node within a network”, as Michel Foucault 
argued in The archaeology of knowledge,
35
 and the way every text and subject are shaped by the 
discourses they are grounded in and constituted by.
Genetic criticism and distributed cognition 
Although different approaches towards the issue of authorship within genetic criticism 
have been advanced, a new perspective may be put forward by investigating developments 
in cognitive science of the last few decades. Cognitive science is interested in understanding 
the nature and working of the mind and entails various disciplines such as neuroscience, 
biology, robotics, and philosophy. It is only logical that genetic critics would be interested in 
this domain since understanding the nature of literary creation may be regarded as part of the 
larger problems of the mind and manuscripts can be seen as the, albeit fragmentary, records 
of mental processes.
36
 A new impetus to reconciling genetic criticism with a poststructuralist 
denial of a centre of authorship in any text may be provided by the philosophical paradigm 
of distributed or situated cognition. I wish to illuminate this proposition with a case study 
that will offer a genetic and narratological analysis of two scenes in Virginia Woolf’s To the 
lighthouse. My aim is to suggest the common ground of genetic criticism, post-structuralism 
and recent developments in cognitive science and explore the theoretical implications of 
combining a narratological and cognitive-genetic approach to a canonical modernist text. 
31 Bryant, J. The fluid text: 
a theory of revision and 
editing for book and 
screen. Editorial theory 
and literary criticism. 
Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan 
Press, 2005, p.11.
32 Quoted in Deppman, J. 
et al. Op. cit., 2004, p. 8.
33 Hay, L. Op. cit., 
2004, p. 23.
34 Bushell, S. Op. cit., 
2009, pp. 54-61.
35 1969, quoted 
in Caughie, P. 
L.,  2007, p. 7.
36 Shillingsburg, P. L. 
Resisting texts: authority 
and submission 
in constructions 
of meaning. Ann 
Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 1997
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The mind has always been of interest to literary writers and many have investigated and 
presented its working in different ways. A writer who was overtly interested in the issue of 
consciousness and the mechanisms behind literary creation was Virginia Woolf. In regard of 
the writing process of To the lighthouse, written between 1925 and 1927, she stated in a diary 
entry that it seemed to have flowed from her “in a great, apparently involuntary, rush” like “(b)
lowing bubbles out of a pipe”. Although she first deemed the whole process one of exorcism, 
she eventually came to regard the writing itself as a way of creating a mental image that she 
did not have before: “I used to think of (father) & mother daily; but writing (it), laid them in 
my mind...”.
37
 This testimony forms an adequate illustration of a specific cognitive process that 
goes on while writing, a process which, according to theories of distributed cognition, would 
not be possible without the writing tools (paper, pen, typewriter etc.) at hand. It is through 
writing about her parents, through carefully selecting words on paper, being confronted with 
these words, critically scrutinizing the images so created and adjusting them, that finally Woolf 
possesses, creates or receives an image of her parents “in her mind”. Although Woolf, as she 
often does, employs imagery that strongly affirms a Cartesian mind-body divide, she testifies 
to a cognitive process that clearly resists this dualism. According to a dualistic, cognitivist 
perspective on writing, an author would possess some mental image, a “representation” that 
they wish to express and thus transpose to the piece of paper in front of them. Woolf, however, 
admits that it is through the act of writing itself that the image or memory of her parents is 
created and becomes a graspable or discussable “reality”, it becomes something much more 
defined than before. In this way the act of writing may be regarded as an act of thinking as 
such. The cognitive process that takes place is not only dependent on an environmental vehicle 
outside the writer’s head. It is actually constituted by that vehicle. 
This conception of writing clearly underscores the theory of the “extended mind”, also 
known as “active externalism”. In their foundational article “The extended mind” (1998) Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers demonstrate that certain cognitive processes do not take place 
“inside” the head but in fact loop out into the world and entail a tight coupling between a 
thinking agent and an external environment, which figures as some sort of scaffolding 
structure. The brain then is a pattern-recognition and pattern-completion engine with limited 
problem-solving abilities, which we have learned to amplify with cognitive technologies in our 
environment. In this sense, certain cognitive processes transcend the skin-and-skull boundary 
and do not simply depend on an environmental structure, but are actually partly constituted by 
it. Writing then must be regarded as an interaction between neural processes, bodily processes, 
and the manipulation of written sentences. The on-going cognitive process does not merely 
take place inside the head, but needs writing vehicles to allow storage and manipulations that 
ensure the completion of cognitive tasks that would be difficult or impossible without.
38
 In 
this sense, language as such, written or spoken, may be regarded as the ultimate environmental 
“artefact”
39
 that has reshaped human cognition. As Merlin Donald argues in Origins of the 
modern mind (1991), it has allowed for memory to be stored outside the mind.
40
 Creativity, in its 
most general sense, can be explained then as the on-going process of continual loops between 
brain and world and imaginative abilities are extended by putting things on paper.
41
 
37 Woolf, V. The diary of 
Virginia Woolf. Edited 
by Anne Olivier Bell 
and Andrew McNeillie. 
5 Volumes. London: 
Hogarth Press, 1977-
84.  1928, November 
28, Diaries Vol. 3, 
p.  208, my italics.
38 Menary, R. Writing 
as thinking. Language 
Sciences 29, 2007, p. 
622. doi: 10.1016/j.
langsci.2007.01.005 
39 Clark, A. Being there: 
putting brain, body, 
and world together 
again. Cambridge, MA, 
London: The MIT 
Press, 1997, pp. 193-213.
40 Quoted in Menary, R. 
Op. cit.,  2007, p. 625.
41 Dartnall, T.H. 
“Creativity, cognition 
and cyborgs: the 
extended mind 
hypothesis as an 
explanatory framework 
for creativity research.” 
In: The creative 
enterprise: culture, 
edited by Tony Davila, 
Marc J. Epstein and 
Robert D. Shelton, 
99-122. Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing 
Group,  2007, p. 115.
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The notion of the extended mind is one of the new ways of thinking about the 
mind that has been developing in cognitive science in the last few decades. Alongside 
other frameworks such as the embedded, the embodied and the enactive mind it forms 
the postcognitivist paradigm of distributed or situated cognition, which is essentially 
anti-Cartesian in foregrounding the “inextricable tangles of feedback, feedforward, 
and feedaround loops that continuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and 
world,” also referred to as the “porous” model in contrast to the “brainbound” model.
42
 
Virginia Woolf, To the lighthouse
As David Herman (2011) and Dirk Van Hulle (2014) have demonstrated, Woolf and other 
modernist authors form interesting case studies to re-investigate from the perspective of 
distributed cognition because the rhetoric these writers employed to defend and justify their 
innovative writing style was filled with references to a Cartesian inner/outer model of the 
mind but the fictional characters they created, actually display supreme examples of distributed 
cognition and thus disrupt the classic dualism of mind versus body. The new form of writing 
Woolf helped establish within the vast field of literary modernism, has received different labels, 
such as “psychological” or “introverted” novel or “new realism” in contemporary and later 
criticism
43
 and shares innovative techniques such as interior monologue, disruption of temporal 
continuity and stream-of-consciousness, with authors including Dorothy Richardson, James 
Joyce and William Faulkner. Being one of the most notable theoretical thinkers of literary 
Modernism, Woolf’s most cited phrases - such as her appeal to “[l]ook within and ... examine 
for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day”
44
 - have contributed to the continual 
interpretation of these writers’ literary practices as an inward turn rather than a presentation 
of the world-as-experienced. However, it has been demonstrated that the fictional narratives 
these modernists created can be labelled no more of an inward turn than the realistic fiction 
of their “material” predecessors can.
45
 In fact, narratological analyses from the perspective of 
distributed cognition have proven fertile in demonstrating that the character portrayals in 
these narratives form clear illustrations of the extended, the embodied and the enactive mind 
at work. 
Many scenes in Woolf’s To the lighthouse are traditionally described as exemplary instances 
of stream-of-consciousness, whereby the reader enters the character’s mind and is provided 
the opportunity to follow the whimsical flux of thought fragments, impressions, emotions and 
all other things that constitute especially Mrs Ramsay’s “ordinary mind” on days of summer 
spent at the holiday home in Scotland. The following analysis attempts to show how an 
investigation of Woolf”s manuscripts from the perspective of the extended mind may help in 
illuminating her writing process. In terms of exogenesis
46
 I will elaborate on the manner in 
42 Clark, A. “Embodied, 
embedded, and 
extended cognition.” 
In: The Cambridge 
handbook of cognitive 
science, edited by Keith 
Frankish and William 
M. Ramsey. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University 
Press, 2012, p. 277. 
43 Fletcher, J.  and 
Bradbury, M.  “The 
introverted novel.” In 
Modernism. 1890-1930, 
edited by  
Malcolm Bradbury 
and James McFarlan. 
Penguin Guides to 
European Literature. 
New York: Penguin 
Books, 1976, pp. 
394-415; Parsons,  
D. Theorists of the 





London, New York: 
Routledge, 2007, p. 10 
44 Woolf, V. “Modern 
fiction.” In: The 
common Reader. 
Hardmonsworth: 
Penguin Books Limited. 
[1919] 1938, p. 148.
45 Herman, D. “1880-
1945. Re-minding 
modernism.” In: The 
emergence of mind: 
representations of 
consciousness in 
narrative discourse in 
English, edited by David 
Herman. Frontiers of 
Narrative. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska 
Press, 2011; Van Hulle, 
D. Op. cit., 2014.
46 This term was 
introduced by 
Raymonde Debray 
Genette and is used 
to denote external 
source texts concerning 
the writing process 
(Van Hulle, D. Op. 
cit., 2014, p. 14).
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which Woolf  - in a late stage of her writing - made a number of decisions that have determined 
the interpretation of the novel to this day. On the level of endogenesis
47
 I will clarify how Woolf 
deliberately narrowed a crucial scene down to the mental functioning of Mrs Ramsay in order 
to invoke a stream-of-consciousness, but nevertheless established an image of a woman”s 
mind in constant interaction with her environment, thereby placing special emphasis on the 
distributed workings of memory. Furthermore, I will suggest that Woolf”s interaction with 
her own manuscripts may have provided her insight into the working of her own mind and 
informed the portrayal of Mrs Ramsay”s mind at work. The interpretation of these manuscripts 
will then form an aid in formulating a new perspective on the notion of authorship within 
genetic criticism. 
In Chapter Eleven (85-89) in the first part of the novel “The window”, we encounter Mrs 
Ramsay, mother of eight children, but at present completely alone, sitting by the window, 
knitting and reflecting on herself, her life and the necessity and pleasures of being alone. Mr 
Ramsay is in the neighbourhood but throughout the entire scene the couple does not speak 
with each other. Mrs Ramsay”s mind is “filled” with a number of things. She thinks about the 
disappointment of her son James, who cannot go to the lighthouse the day after. She is certain 
that children never forget such things (85-6). A particular phrase “pops into her head”: “We 
are in the hands of God” (86-7). She notices the light beam of the lighthouse, with which she 
heavily identifies (86, 88). The stream of consciousness Woolf has thus created is one which 
would encourage a reader to believe that Mrs Ramsay’s thoughts and feelings are hermetically 
sealed off and that she finds intense pleasure in the freedom of roaming around in her own 
mind, without any children, guests or servants to bother her while doing so. Although we 
also get an insight into Mr Ramsay’s mind, the two protagonists do not literally communicate 
with each other and this intensifies the feeling of lonely introspection. The impossibility of 
communication is underscored by Mr Ramsay’s heartache at not being able to “reach her” 
(89), and this “remoteness pained him” (88). And indeed, Mrs Ramsay believes her real self 
to be a “wedge-shaped core of darkness, something invisible to others”. People only know 
each other by superficial things, phrases, actions: “Beneath it is all dark, it is all spreading, 
it is unfathomably deep; but now and again we rise to the surface and that is what you see 
us by” (85). The imagery Woolf uses to describe the mind is diverse, but a sense of deepness, 
darkness and concealment prevails. Next to the examples already mentioned, it is notable 
that twice she uses the image of a “floor” to talk about mental experiences: “There rose ... 
off the floor of the mind ... a mist, a bride to meet her lover” (87) and “waves of pure delight 
raced over the floor of her mind” (89). It is clear that the focus of this chapter is the mind 
of Mrs Ramsay, the tension between “real” and “superficial” self, the impossibility of “real” 
communication and notably, the function of memory: children never forget anything and 
Mrs Ramsay is confronted with a phrase she remembers but fails to recognize as her own. 
47 Endogenesis then 
focuses on the actual 
writing of drafts, 
which also includes 
the assimilation of the 
external information 
in the actual work 
(Van Hulle, D. Op. 
cit.,  2013, p. 230).
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Endogenesis and the working of memory
Examination of the initial holograph drafts
48
 from which this particular scene emerged, 
reveals that Woolf in the course of her writing process deliberately narrowed the entire scene 
down to the “internal” mental life of Mrs Ramsay and re-organized her original draft so as to 
allow as little as possible intrusion from “outside”. Thus, in construing this scene, Woolf was 
aiming to bring into practice her own device to “look within” and reveal the “flickering” of the 
mind by presenting her protagonist as isolated as possible, even if this sense of isolation might 
not have come to her in a spontaneous or instinctive way while writing. 
The first version of the scene, written on February 22, 1926 (Holograph 211) begins with Mrs 
Ramsay reading a story to James and being released from this task by nanny Mildred. In the 
final edition, this rather interactive part is transposed to the end of the previous chapter, thus 
allowing chapter eleven to begin with Mrs Ramsay sitting alone at the window, alone as she 
can be in a house filled with people who during the daytime continuously intrude upon her 
inner musings. In the draft version this complete isolation was disrupted by her speaking to 
her husband: she says to Mr Ramsay “how at the back of her mind, she did not despair”. But 
in the final edition husband and wife do not speak to each other at all. In the holograph (213) 
manuscript the narrative continues from that point and Mrs Ramsay is reminded of a phrase 
“they” and “her mother” used to say: “We are in the hands of the Lord” (213). In the published 
text, however, any mention of “they” or “her mother” is omitted from the narrative and Mrs 
Ramsay keeps wondering where the phrase that has just popped into her mind might possibly 
have come from. It is never disclosed that it was a phrase “they” or her mother used and it is 
presented as entering Mrs Ramsay’s mind “out of the blue”, as something that has been put 
into her mind: “Who had said it? not she” (86). In the original holograph version and in the 
typescripts
49
 Mrs Ramsay clearly remembers her mother using the phrase and she seems to 
appropriate it, seeing it fit for the context, but then the narrator adds: “She did not mean it.”.  
This concern about the emergence or retrieval of memories, and about the way the process 
of remembering is presented in the narrative, as well as the repeated statements on the 
memories of children demonstrate the importance of the matter to Woolf while writing the 
novel. It may indeed come as no surprise since it has been well established that Woolf, by writing 
the novel, aimed to reconstruct her own childhood memories and to sketch a portrait of her 
parents.
50
 Keeping in mind the diary note in which Woolf testifies that the memories seemed 
to come to her involuntarily and that through writing, her parents had been “laid in her mind”, 
it may be suggested that Woolf became aware of the way memory works through writing. 
It is therefore remarkable that in her first draft she presented a classic model of memory: 
the protagonist remembers something her mother says. However, through confrontation 
with her own writing process, she became aware of the limitations of such a model. 
     A traditional understanding of memory would indeed connect certain images and textual 
bits and pieces to exact events or people that played an important role in our lives once. It 
might seem natural to apprehend the mind as a storage room full of memories that are kept 
there like archival pieces. And indeed, classic accounts of memory do regard the mind as a 
“wax block” on which memories are impressed or as an “aviary” in which fluttering memories 
have been trapped only to be caught by our conscious efforts to remember them.
51
 These 
models, however, have been punctured by connectionist models of memory
52
 that describe 
memory as a non-computational process of invention and revision. This non-archival model 
of memory is characterized by continual change and adaptation and denies the possibility of 
48 Fully transcribed 
on <http://www.
woolfonline.com/>. 
49 Sent to Charles 
Mauron. <http://www.
woolfonline.com>.
50 Proof for this can 
be found in many 
diary entries. The 
following was written 
on Thursday 14 May 
1925: “I’m now all on 
the strain with desire 
to stop journalism 
& get on to To the 
lighthouse. This is going 
to be fairly short: to 
have father’s character 
done complete in it; 
& mothers; & St Ives; 
& childhood; & all 
the usual things I try 
to put in—life, death 
&c. But the centre 
is father’s character, 
sitting in a boat, reciting 
We perished, each 
alone, while he crushes 
a dying mackerel—
However, I must 
refrain. I must write a 
few little stories first, 
& let the Lighthouse 
simmer, adding to it 
between tea & dinner 
till it is complete 
for writing out.”.
51 Elkins, K. Middling 
memories and 
dreams of oblivion: 
configurations of a 
non-archival memory 
in Baudelaire and 
Proust. Discourse 24 
(3), 2002, pp. 55-9. 
<http://www.jstor.org/
stable/41389655>.
52 Bolles, E. Remembering 
and forgetting: an 
inquiry into the 
nature of memory. 
New York: Walker 
and Company,1988; 
Rosenfield, I. The 
invention of memory: a 
new view of the brain. 
Basic Books: New York, 
1988; Schacter, D. 
L. Memory distortion: 
how minds, brains and 
societies reconstruct 
the past. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 1995.
Manuscrítica  §  n. 28 • 2015
revista de crítica genética
Cognitive-genetic narratology and the fictional mind in To the lighthouse
Ateliê
102
II. Modernism and the (extended) mind
storing all past experiences in our mind, as a computer stores data on a hard drive. Seeing 
the fact that this is a model of remembering that relies heavily on piecing together a memory 
“that is recollected only after encountering a fragment that reminds us of it in the external 
world” and remembering entails a “continual looping process - modification followed by re-
evaluation - that continues until I ‘recognize’ the recollection”,
53
 memory must be regarded as 
a form of distributed cognition and in this way the external environment becomes an essential 
extension to our mind. When the mind recognizes fragments in its environment and uses 
these interactions as an “iterated series of pattern-completing computations” we can come 
to see it as an “associative engine”
54
 that not only depends on the environment but is also 
constituted by it. In this sense the mind is rather empty and memories are not “stored” but 
constantly “created” by the mind’s involvement with the environment. 
Essential then is the fact that Woolf in her initial manuscripts seemed to present the 
functioning of memory in a traditional cognitivist way, as a form of “retrieval from a stored 
symbolic database”, but replaced this by a different view of memory that functions more as 
“pattern re-creation” whereby cognition becomes “decentralized” and the environment can 
be regarded as “an active resource”.
55
 This is the view of memory endorsed by propagators of 
distributed cognition today. Mrs Ramsay’s confrontation with a phrase that “pops” up in her 
head rather than her remembering her mother saying that phrase, comes closer to an idea of 
mind that is not dualistically separated from the world, but forms a whole, in the sense that 
they function together intrinsically and their mutual boundaries are not that straightforward 
to determine. Investigation of the manuscripts that led up to the definite scene confirms that 
Woolf was aware of a difference between these two modes of presentation.
The mind is the world
To reinforce this suggestion, the scene may be reconsidered from a narratological, 
postcognitivist framework in order to demonstrate that Mrs Ramsay’s mind is not isolated but 
in fact determined by the constant engagement with her environment, and thus inseparably 
embedded in contexts for action and interaction.
56
 This sense of engagement may be labelled a 
characteristic of an enactive or embodied model of the mind, which opposes earlier accounts 
of cognition as being a representational mechanism that receives informational input and 
through inner computations transforms these into output under the guise of behaviour such as 
linguistic utterances. This traditional model of input versus output, subject versus object and 
mind versus world, is thus replaced by an enactivist model whereby cognition is regarded as 
the enactment of world and mind. Cognitive processes cannot be separated from sensory and 
motor processes, perception and action
57
 and mental states are to be understood in relation to 
“affordances”. Gibson defines these affordances in An Ecological Approach to Visual Perception 
(1979) as action possibilities tightly imbricated with local environments for acting.
58
 Thus we 
should regard Mrs Ramsay’s mind-wandering as arising out of previous interactions with 
material and social surroundings, that now give rise to the world she experiences or enacts.
59
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George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s Metaphors We Live by (1980) is one of the pioneering 
works on situated cognition and explains how our experience of certain abstract notions, such 
as love or self, depends on the particular body we have and how that body interacts with 
its surroundings. In this sense cognition must be regarded as dynamic sensorimotor activity 
whereby an agent’s knowledge of the world emerges through its bodily engagement with the 
environment.
60
 This conception of the embodied mind is especially useful seeing how Mrs 
Ramsay’s metaphorical language in this particular scene is completely determined by the 
environment that surrounds her. She sees the darkness of the night, the horizon above the 
dark sea and the lighthouse that is casting its light beams over the water. The language she 
uses to describe her own self completely mirrors this exterior scene: she sees her inner self as 
a wedge of darkness (like the light beam), it is deep and has a surface (like the sea) and in her 
imagination her mental horizon is limitless. Mrs Ramsay’s sense of self is clearly informed by 
her surroundings, by what she sees at that moment and what her body has experienced in those 
surroundings before. According to an enactive approach to the mind, notions of “deepness” or 
“surface” only acquire meaning because we have acted on the world before, because we have 
physically experienced how it feels to be in deep waters, and this illustrates how the mind is a 
system based on experiences in and of the world. 
Furthermore, this approach characterizes the mind as a mechanism that enacts the 
world in which it operates, in order to make useful distinctions that are based on the human 
organism’s own characteristics. Thus cognition and environment become simultaneously 
enacted. The world appears to the perceiver as affording certain kinds of interactions, and the 
perceiver uses the world with his body and mind in the afforded manner.
61
 In characterizing 
the enactment of a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the structure 
embodied by the cognitive system of the perceiving agent, enactivism can also be traced back 
to the biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s sense of Umwelt construction, whereby the concept of 
“Umwelt” stands for the specific and unique model any organism has of the world, and this 
model, this “interpretation” of the world, is made up of the characteristics of the world that 
are meaningful to that organism.
62
 Thus, in the creation of storyworlds modernist writers 
can be seen as “Umwelt researchers” who enact the world of their characters in a way that is 
meaningful and distinctive to them. Woolf’s engagement with the Umwelt of her manuscripts 
may have informed the Umwelt she created in her stories. In this specific example we see how 
her decision to portray the working of memory in an essentially distributed and fragmented 
sense, only took form after being confronted with the mechanism of her own memory during 
her writing process. Seeing the interactive character of writing, the recurrence of “action loops” 
between mind and manuscript, it is logical that she portrayed the working of Mrs Ramsay’s 
mind in the same way. This shows that “her experience with manuscripts as an instrumental 
extension of her own mind during the creative process serves as a model for evoking the 
workings of her characters’ minds”.
63
Enactivist and embodied models of the mind also bear witness to predecessors such 
as Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who contributed to establishing the 
phenomenological tradition of the mind by emphasizing the continuity and difficulty of 
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distinguishing between inner subject and outer object. One of phenomenology’s main topics 
is the way any experience of the world is obstructed, limited or determined because we 
experience everything through language.
64
 Linguistically shaped concepts and ideas determine 
the meaning and content of any given experience although these meanings cannot be equalled 
to those experiences as such. This also explains how the notion of embodied experience is 
not limited to individual experience, but depends on shared cultural modes of experience, 
language being one of the principal shared cultural practices.
65
 The holograph drafts of To the 
lighthouse reveal Woolf was very aware of the way reality is “created” by the perceiving subject 
and the importance of language as one of the fundamental tenets in an organism’s cognitive 
system and enactment of the world. In her initial drafts, she expresses an awareness of the 
constraints imposed by language in human experience when she states that Mrs Ramsay does 
not possess the language to express herself:
She watched the lighthouse for a minute or two. There was no reply. For in asking 
this or that of life, in praying, questioning, one must have at one’s command language, 
which she had not; one must altogether be made differently; for in her, for she never 
saw things, or formulated things; but only opposed to fate, what she ... was, that she  
did not by any means give way; & was able to understand without moving from her 
chair. (Holograph 215, my italics) 
Although this entire passage is omitted from the final text, it may be of help in interpreting 
Woolf’s concerns at the moment of creating this particular scene. Furthermore, the insistence 
on language as a determining factor in an agent’s perception and enactment of the world, 
as expressed in phenomenologist and enactivist accounts corresponds to a poststructuralist 
emphasis on the way every subject is grounded in and determined by language.  
The acknowledgement of language as an exterior force determining the working of the inner 
mind, implies a failure of a traditional dualism of mind versus world and strong indications 
exist that modernist writers were aware of the breakdown of this Cartesian dualism and would 
have objected to the characterization of their writing as an “inward turn”. The intellectual 
climate of the first half of the twentieth century testifies to a great scepticism towards this 
dualism. Proof of this attitude can be found in a 1926 Times Literary Supplement article 
titled “The dethronement of Descartes”, in A.O. Lovejoy’s Revolt against dualism (1929) or T.S. 
Eliot’s Clark Lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge.
66
 Even in the nineteenth century, doubts 
were formulated concerning the mind-body divide in relation to literature, as becomes clear 
from Vanessa L. Ryan’s discussion (2009) of James Sully’s interpretation of the “psychological 
novels” of George Eliot. Furthermore, even if modernist writers employed a rhetoric 
charged with dualistic metaphors that seem to confirm the Cartesian divide between mind 
and body, there are instances in their critical writing that contradict this stance. Exemplary 
in this respect is Woolf’s essay Modern fiction that has come to be regarded as the supreme 
pamphlet for the modernist “inward turn” because in it Woolf praises James Joyce’s literary 
method as an adequate way of portraying the inner working of the mind. However, what most 
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accounts neglect to mention is that Woolf is not entirely convinced of Joyce’s method and 
still seems to be missing something.
67
 She therefore spends the rest of the essay distancing 
herself from the literary method that she has just promoted since she cannot completely agree 
with its concentration on one individual mind, since it fails to “acknowledge the interaction of 
consciousness with the world around it”:
68
Is it due to the method that we feel neither jovial nor magnanimous, but centred 
in a self which, in spite of its tremor or susceptibility, never embraces or creates 
what is outside itself and beyond? Does the emphasis laid, perhaps didactically, upon 
indecency, contribute to the effect of something angular and isolated? ... did not 
the reading of Ulysses suggest how much of life is excluded or ignored, and did it 
not come with a shock to open Tristram Shandy or even Pendennis and be by them 




To Woolf more is necessary than simply turning “inward” and recording the impressions 
that fall upon that mind. In her critical and personal writing, Woolf condemns not only the 
materialism of the Edwardians but also the egoism of the moderns, exemplified by Joyce 
and Dorothy Richardson, whose rendering of the self-absorbed mind fails to capture the 
permeability of consciousness and relativity of identity:
What the unity shall be I have yet to discover: the theme is a blank to me; but I see 
immense possibilities in the form I hit upon more or less by chance two weeks ago. 
I suppose the danger is the damned egotistical self; which ruins Joyce & [Dorothy] 
Richardson to my mind: is one pliant & rich enough to provide a wall from the 




In her early writing, it is clear that Woolf was still very much struggling to define 
what exactly she wished to convey in her own fiction, but in her later autobiographical “A 
Sketch of the Past” she more clearly denunciates a Cartesian dualism that separates internal 
mind from external world, and these doubts may well have informed her own literary 
endeavours. In this memoir Woolf elaborates on her conception of the “self” and clarifies 
the changeability of anyone’s personality. She sees herself as “a fish in a stream”
71
 and senses 
“that behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we - I mean all human beings - are 
connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are parts of the work 
of art... we are the words; we are the music; we are the thing itself”.
72
 Thus she presents the 
self a “finely tuned mechanism, sensitive as a seismograph to the slightest vibration in the 
social environment, and hence volatile like the flux and multiplicity of experience to which 
it is exposed”.
73
 The fact that people are essentially a part of the world, of a shared stream, 
is what blurs the outer limits of personality and makes it unstable. The self responds to the 
forces outside in a way that makes its own boundaries blurred and its core non-existent. It 
was Woolf’s ambition to capture in writing these moments of clarity, when the unreality 
of the Cartesian distinction between inner self and outer reality becomes apparent. 
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Exogenesis and children’s stories
Returning to Chapter Eleven then, the idea of memory that Woolf develops in this scene 
and the omitted notion of language as a determining factor in a subject’s enactment of the 
world and self, corresponds with the poststructuralist notion of the subject being determined 
by and lost in the discourses that make up his being and it is especially in this sense that genetic 
criticism, post-structuralism and models of distributed cognition find common ground. 
Manuscript research of yet another scene in To the lighthouse may offer more evidence and 
demonstrate further how genetic analysis provides insight into the working of the extended 
mind as an associative engine. Throughout the first part of the novel Mrs Ramsay is reading a 
fairy tale to her son James. In the published text this is Grimm’s fairy tale of The fisherman and 
his wife, also known as The flounder. But in the original manuscripts, Woolf was undecided and 
what was first “the story of the three dwarfs”
74
 became “the story of the Woodman’s daughter” 
later on.
75
 She decided to use the Fisherman tale while revising her original drafts and typing 
them out in October 1926, and she quotes it literally in the text. She used the text from Margaret 
Hunt’s translation of Grimm’s household tales in Bohn’s Standard Library Edition and she also 
wrote in the words of a number of other texts, such as Shakespeare’s “98th Sonnet” and William 
Browne’s Sirens song.
76
 The fact that she decided to use the utterly misogynist Fisherman fairy 
tale and not the other tales is not unimportant since it has had a considerable impact on the 
interpretation of the entire novel as an attack on patriarchy and a pamphlet for feminism.
77
 
Apart from these direct references to the fairy tale, Woolf rewrote large parts of the text and 
in chapter ten, right after quoting a number of lines from the fairy tale, she lets Mrs Ramsay 
wander in her own thoughts while reading the story to her son: 
Mrs Ramsay wondered, reading and thinking, quite easily, both at the same time; 
for the story of the Fisherman and his wife was like the bass gently accompanying a 
tune,  which now and then ran up unexpectedly into the melody. And when 
should she be  told? [...] She was responsible to Minta’s parents – the Owl and 
the Poker. Her nicknames for them shot into her mind as she read.
78
 
While reading, Mrs Ramsay’s thoughts and memories are triggered by the text she has in 
front of her. The reference to these nicknames can be found in the holograph drafts but they 
are inserted in the margins of the notebook. It is not clear when exactly Woolf made these 
additional notes to the text. Perhaps Woolf inserted the nicknames while re-reading her first 
draft materials, or perhaps while contemplating a better choice of fairy tale or perhaps she 
only thought of the nicknames while interweaving the Fisherman fairy tale to her original text. 
What is the link between the Fisherman tale and these anthropomorphic characters? The owl 
and the poker are not characters in any of Grimm’s tales but they do figure in a children’s book 
that was published in the late nineteenth century: Edward Lear’s Nonsense songs, stories, botany, 
and alphabets (1871). The owl and the poker are not featured as a duo in this work, but they do 
play a part in two separate rhymes: “The owl and the pussy-cat” and “The broom, the shovel, 
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the poker and the tongs”. From the preserved collaborative family journal of Woolf and her 
siblings, “Hyde Park Gate News”, we know that Edward Lear was one of the children’s authors 
that Woolf grew up with.
79
 If we assume Woolf inserted the notes in a later stage of writing, 
the traces of the writing process may reveal the mind to be an “associative engine” and this 
claim is reinforced when we know the characters of the owl and the poker in both of Lear’s 
stories perform the role of subservient admirer of a beautiful female figure, thus echoing the 
fisherman who obeys his wife unconditionally, leading both into utter catastrophe. This is not 
to claim that Mrs Ramsay thinks of Minta’s parents in this sense. What it could reveal however, 
is the way the mind works while writing and it also illustrates what Mrs Ramsay claims in this 
scene: that reading and thinking occur at the same time. It demonstrates that memories and 
knowledge are not stored in our archival memory and instantaneously gathered when they 
are needed. The mind works in an associative manner and an author may gain insight into 
their own life, mind and memory by writing as such, in ways that would be impossible without 
the “scaffolding” structure provided by the “environment”, be it the manipulation of writing 
tools immediately at hand, the interaction with manuscripts or the reading of children’s stories 
a long time ago. Furthermore, the analysis of the writing process forms an illustration of 
poststructuralist accounts of intertextuality in the sense that this literary work can be shown 
to be full of references to other signifying systems, other texts, and the author may be regarded 
as a node within a vast network of intertextual relations that he or she might not even be aware 
of. The merit of a genetic-critical analysis lies exactly in the possibility of uncovering these 
relations and thus laying bare the distribution of mind across the world it acts upon.
Conclusion
 
     From the above, it may be suggested that a postcognitivist model of distributed cognition 
forms a confirmation of Barthes’ resistance to a “metaphysics of presence”, in the sense that 
the human mind as the ultimate centre of communication cannot be maintained, since mind is 
distributed across world and body. Furthermore, it allows for an insistence on genetic material 
as a valid and indispensable source in interpreting any writing process since it bears the physical 
traces of distributed cognition at work while de-emphasizing the central role the author plays 
in this process. Thus, applying the model of the extended mind to genetic criticism - by some 
deemed to be a form of “biographism”
80
 or a “romantic” discipline aimed at resurrecting the 
author
81
  - affirms that the poststructuralist denial of origins to authorial consciousness must 
not be necessarily apprehended as a denial of intention but, as Sally Bushell formulates it, as an 
appeal to “redefine the nature of intention, which can no longer be about the externalization 
of inner thought”.
82
 It illustrates her assertion that concepts such as externalization, expression, 
inner self - emerging from an old dualistic conception of mind versus body - in relation to 
language and meaning are too limited to understand mind and world.
The reconciliation between genetic criticism, the paradigm of distributed cognition and 
post-structuralism’s dismissal of authorial intention proposed here is only a first exploration 
of problems to be untangled. Furthermore, a number of limitations to the exercise must be kept 
in mind. First of all, when claiming that the study of the writing process via careful examining 
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of manuscripts and notebooks may provide insight into the working of the writer’s mind, 
we must be careful not to present this undertaking as resulting in a “complete” or “objective” 
view of the human mind. What accounts of distributed cognition reveal first and foremost, is 
that the human mind cannot be reduced to a machine-like apparatus that receives input from 
its environment, transforms these into representations and then expresses these as output in 
the form of human behaviour such as speech, art or writing. Especially the theories of the 
embodied and enactive mind prove to us how essential (unconscious) action movements 
and sensorimotor experience are for the development of cognitive processes. Language 
and literature are essentially representational and form only a part of the workings of the 
(conscious) mind. Therefore, in studying the genetic dossier of a work of literature we must 
be aware that all we are tracing are conscious reflections of the writer, and that the large part 
of sensory experiences (sound, touch, smells, which may have influenced the writer at the 
moment of writing) cannot be traced in these material documents as such. Thus this exercise 
can only affirm Louis Hay when he states that “even the most detailed and well-conserved 
documentation reveals but a fraction of the complicated mental processes to which it bears 
witness. The ink on the page is not the writing itself”.
83
 Additionally, any sense of the diversity 
of literature will affirm that each writer and each “writing mind” is unique. This sense of 
uniqueness must be acknowledged and respected, and every literary critic must be wary of 
generating a universal model of the mind that sweeps away the very specificity of a literary 
work and its creator.  
A final caveat is concerned with the objectiveness of any genetic-critical analysis. Although 
genetic criticism may present a more concrete or materialistic practice than many other, equally 
valuable, approaches within the domain of literary criticism, a true form of objectiveness is 
difficult to attain and interpretations of gaps, omissions and changes in manuscripts are as 
subjective as those interpretations are in regard of a “final”, published text. However, even if the 
account is never fully objective or complete, an undeniable merit of any genetic-critical analysis 
lies in the coherence it brings into the historical raw materials, especially if the researcher is 
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